The Security Council,
PP1: Reaffirming the vision expressed in Security Council Resolution 1397, “of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,”
PP2: Reaffirming the two principles for the attainment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East articulated in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, (i) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied” in the 1967 conflict, (ii) “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or act of force”;
PP3: Further reaffirming the call in UNSC Resolution 242 for “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;”
PP4: Observing the need for the international community to today go beyond UNSC Resolution 242 and provide fuller guidance on the principles on which Israeli-Palestinian peace should be based;
PP5: Noting that the application of the State of Palestine for membership in the United Nations of 23 September 2011, stated that the application is based on the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine of 15 November 1988;
PP6: Drawing attention to the fact that the Palestinian Declaration of Independence of 1988 affirmed the international legitimacy of the Partition Resolution of 1947, and noted that the Partition Resolution called for “two states, one Arab and one Jewish,”
PP7: Reiterating the determination of the Security Council in UNSC Resolution 298, that “all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status” of Jerusalem are “invalid and cannot change that status”;
PP8: Reaffirming the importance of the call for immediate negotiations to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East as found in Security Council Resolution 338;
OP1: Affirms that the establishment of a just and lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should include the application of the following principles:
OP1-i: (i) Israel was created as a Jewish State under international law, and will remain one if it so chooses;
OP1-ii: (ii) There will be substantial compensation for the Palestinian refugees, but no significant return of refugees to Israel;
OP1-iii: (iii) The future Palestinian State will not be allowed to develop a military capability that can endanger Israeli security, and will be subject to prolonged monitoring of the Palestine-Jordan border;
OP1-iv: (iv) Israel will have to evacuate almost all of the West Bank, with equivalent territorial exchanges for the remainder;
OP1-v: (v) Israel must relinquish much of East Jerusalem, in line with the formula “What is Arab will be Palestinian, what is Jewish will be Israeli”;
OP1-vi: (vi) Israel will have to accept some creative solution for the Temple Mount, which is not and will not be recognized under international law as under exclusive Israeli sovereignty.
OP2: 2. Calls on Israel and the PLO to announce their acceptance of this resolution and to return to comprehensive permanent status negotiations.
Explanatory Notes for New 242 Resolution
Adopted in 1967, Resolution 242 played a significant role in articulating the principles that should serve as a basis for lasting Middle East peace. UN Security Council 338 supplemented 242 in calling for immediate negotiations that would be based on 242. In its day, the land for peace framework of 242 represented a major challenge to the parties, and came in 1988 to be accepted by the PLO. Today, more than two decades after the Oslo Accords which called for negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement, despite an extraordinary American effort, Israel and the PLO remain unable to agree upon the basic parameters for a negotiated end of conflict agreement.
There is a need for the international community to now go beyond 242 and lay down basic parameters dealing with key issues not addressed in 242. The importance of achieving a political solution has been underscored by the recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Based on accounts by US officials of progress made in the recent negotiations, there is a good chance that the parties can accept these parameters. However, on the Palestinian side this is much more likely if the parameters come from the Security Council than from the United States. On the Israeli side, clear American support for the Resolution will need to be perceived.
PP1. This goes beyond 242 in affirming the two-state solution. It draws on the precedent of UNSC Resolution 1397.
PP2. Calls attention to the precedent of the Security Council laying down parameters. Specifically endorses the ideas of withdrawal, and of peace and security. Sets the stage for OP1-iii on security, OP1-iv on withdrawal and 1:1 land swaps.
PP3. Calls attention to how 242 addressed the issue of refugees. Sets the stage for OP1-ii on refugees.
PP4. Makes the key point: the need today to go beyond how 242 addressed the major issues.
PP5. Calls attention to the continued relevance of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence to the Palestinian quest of statehood and recognition.
PP6. Calls attention to the precedent provided by the Palestinian Declaration of Independence of Palestinian acceptance of the fact that Israel was created under international legitimacy as a Jewish state. This sets the stage for OP1-i.
PP7. Invokes previous UN Security Council determination on illegitimacy of Israeli annexation of Jerusalem and expansion of municipal boundaries to include parts of the West Bank. UNSC Resolution 298 was very forceful and was supported by the United States. At the time Richard Nixon was President and George H.W. Bush was US Ambassador to the UN. This sets the stage for OP1-v and OP1-vi dealing with Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, topics not addressed in 242.
PP8. Recalls the precedent in UNSC Res. 338 of the Security Council calling for negotiations based on parameters it articulated (242).
OP1-i First of three parameters supporting Israeli positions. This repeats what the Palestinians affirmed in their Declaration of Independence, and goes further to say that it is up to Israel whether it remains a Jewish state. This is essentially a statement of fact, not an affirmation of agreement. The Declaration has the benefit of being Arafat’s legacy, thus this does not call for a new concession from the PLO.
OP1-ii This goes beyond 242 on refugees in saying that they will receive substantial compensation; however, in saying that there will be no “significant” return to Israel it is a powerful pro-Israel determination which in effect limits the implementation of the claimed right of return. Coming from the Security Council from an international law perspective this is a very powerful determination. It is, of course, something that the Palestinian leadership knows it will have to accept, but having it imposed by the Security Council will make it easier for them to do so. The phrase “no significant return” is deliberately vague so as to accommodate both the PLO proposal (attributed to Erekat) that 150,000 refugees will return and Olmert’s proposal to limit the return to 5,000. Given 6,000,000 refugees even a return of 150,000 means that 97% do not return.
OP1-iii This provides more detail to the mention of secure boundaries in 242. Specifically it calls for limitations on the military capability of the Palestinian state and affirms the need for long-term monitoring on the Jordan River. It is deliberately vague about how this will be carried out, thus allowing for the monitors to be essentially American and even for possible Israeli participation in such forces.
OP1-iv This is the first of three parameters that support Palestinian positions. Specifically it adopts the Arab position on 242, that the withdrawal clause means withdrawal from “all” of the territory. It does however allow for territorial swaps so as to make the problem of Israeli settlers more easily subject to resolution. On swaps it adopts the Palestinian position, that they must be 1:1.
OP1-v This formulation is from the Clinton Parameters on East Jerusalem.
OP1-vi This parameter on the Temple Mount allows for many possible solutions. It rules out just one: exclusive Israeli sovereignty.
OP2 This builds on the precedent of UNSC Res. 338 in calling for immediate negotiations based on parameters articulated by the Council.